Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Firm Financing in India by Jayesh Kumar






This study investigates the firm financing patterns in India and the role of corporate 
governance mechanisms. We use firm-level time series data of nearly 2000 listed companies 
from 1994 through 2000, to analyze the firm’s corporate financing behavior in connection 
with its corporate governance arrangements, specially its shareholding pattern. Our results 
show that the capital structure of the firm is non-linearly linked to its corporate governance 
mechanisms (ownership structure). We find that firms with weaker corporate governance 
mechanisms (dispersed shareholding pattern, in particular measured by the entrenchment 
effects of group affiliation) tend to have a higher level of debt. Firms with higher foreign 
ownership or with low institutional ownership tend to have lower debt level. We do not find 
any significant relationship between ownership of directors and corporate with the firm 
financing in India. Overall, the findings presented in the paper provide evidence of definite 
role of corporate governance mechanisms in firm’s financing decisions in India. 
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There has been reasonable consensus among practitioners and academicians about the 
importance of good corporate governance in the economy. Corporate governance has 
received much attention in the emerging market economies, like India in later half of the 
nineties. In a recent study for India, Kumar (2004), using a sample of more than 2000 listed 
firms, finds that corporate governance mechanism (ownership structure) significantly 
influences the firm performance. Corporate ownership structure can act as an incentive 
device for reducing the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and 
management can be used to protect property rights of the firm. 
A large body of literature does confirm the evidence that corporate governance, 
particularly the role of ownership structure, is crucial in determining the incentive of insiders 
to expropriate minority shareholder. The impact of corporate governance on the firm value 
has been extensively studied in recent years. The literature has highlighted the role of 
ownership structure that has the impact on the firm value. Most of the literature on corporate 
governance is concentrated in explaining the firm performance and its determinants. Yet, 
little is known as to how the corporate governance influences firm’s financing policies 
(capital structure).  
The paper aims to bridge research gap by providing a direct empirical test of the 
hypothesis. We hypothesis that the firms with poor corporate governance mechanisms tend to 
have higher level of debt than equity in their portfolio and vise-versa. We are particularly 
interested in the role of firm’s ownership structure with connection to its capital structure. 
Our main research objective is to test whether there are links between the capital structure 
and corporate governance. If so, does debt constrain or facilitate entrenchment? The study of 
the relation between capital structure and corporate governance is advantageous, not only to 
enrich our understanding about whether or not firms that are vulnerable to expropriation issue more debt to have more resources to use for private interests but also which ownership 
groups viz. foreign, corporate, director, institutional have positive or negative impact on the 
debt equity ratio of a firm. This paper also sheds lights on the other possible agency issues in 
determining the firm’s financing decisions. These agency problems may arise between the 
firm’s controlling shareholders and the debt providers and between the debt suppliers and 
their minority shareholders. For example, the controlling shareholder of a firm and the firm’s 
debt providers might belong to the same business groups. In such a case, instead of 
performing the active monitoring and governance function, the debt suppliers could become 
the center of corrupted crony systems. As a consequence, this externality would lead to an 
increase in the level of non-performing loans and hinder the proper functioning of the 
financial system. The government may have to decide to bail out the system, and the 
associated agency costs would get be borne by the taxpayers as a last-resort. 
In early 90s, India started with liberalization, which provides the unique natural 
environment to examine the impact of corporate governance on capital structure. Unlike 
corporations in the US and the UK, which have dispersed ownership, firms in India are 
mainly concentrated ownership, controlled by large shareholders. The family-controlled firm 
is the predominant type of corporation in India. The controlling shareholder often uses the 
pyramid structure, cross-holding structure, and dual-class shares (not very common though in 
Indian scenario) to enhance control of the firm. As a result, the divergence of ownership and 
control occurs in providing incentives for entrenchment.  
While theoretical analysis of corporate governance points out counteracting 
mechanisms of control, the empirical literature tries to shed light on the role of these 
counteracting mechanisms, suggesting firm value is an outcome of these mechanisms. As 
large shareholdings are common in the world, except the US and the UK (Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes, and Shleifer (1999)), it is argued that large shareholders’ incentive to collect information and to monitor management reduces agency costs (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). 
Most of the works in the literature have evolved against the backdrop of developed 
economies, while there is very little known (empirically) about such issues in emerging 
market economies. Bhaduri (2002) develop a model that accounts for the possibility of 
restructuring costs in attaining an optimal capital structure and address the measurements 
problem that arises due to the unobservable nature of attributes influencing the optimal 
capital structure. However, there is no empirical evidence on the relationship of corporate 
governance mechanism and capital structure of corporate firms in India. To our best 
knowledge there is no study in this context for India. 
Since the pioneer work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposed the concept, that the 
general characteristics of a firm’s ownership structure can affect performance has received 
considerable attention but few studies have looked at the relationship between ownership 
structure and capital structure. Corporate debt policy has also been viewed as an internal 
control mechanism, which can reduce agency conflicts between management and 
shareholders, particularly the agency costs of free cash flow as suggested by Jensen (1986). 
Jensen (1986) argues that managers with substantial amounts of free cash flow are likely to 
engage in non-optimal activities. Grossman and Hart (1980) suggest that debt is a disciplinary 
device that may be used to reduce the agency costs of free cash flow. However, as Myres 
(1977) demonstrates, debt can also have undesirable effects such as inducing managers to 
forego positive net present value projects. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that managerial 
shareholding can reduce managerial incentives to consume perquisites, expropriate 
shareholder’s wealth and to engage in other non-maximizing behavior and thereby helps in 
aligning the interests between management and shareholders. 
This paper examines the link between capital structure and shareholding pattern for a 
panel of more than 2000 publicly traded Indian corporate firms over the years 1994 to 2000. We develop our regression framework based on the capital structure theory, suggested by 
corporate finance models. We include the factors that may affect the firm’s capital structure 
into our empirical specifications. These factors are age, size, tangibility, marketing, 
advertising, distribution, R&D expenses, and profitability. We also include industry dummies 
to control the industry effect on firm’s leveraging. The industry classification is defined based 
on National Sample Survey Organization’s National Industrial Classification, 1998. 
We have contributed in four ways to the existing literature. First, we employ an 
econometric framework that specifically controls for firm specific unobserved heterogeneity 
and aggregate macroeconomic shocks. Second, our econometric methodology allows us to 
control for the unobserved firm heterogeneity caused by the ownership structure and other 
observed variables. This approach also provides evidence in favor of the fixed effect 
approach. Thirdly, it uses exact shareholding by different groups of owners, controlling for 
change in firm value due to small change in shareholding pattern (not exactly changing the 
dominance of a group), as in most of the cases shareholders dominance does not change 
dramatically. Finally, this paper is the very first study in case of India, which investigates the 
relationship between the ownership and capital structure. 
Unlike the specifications of Faccio et al. (2003), we do not include the market-based 
variables, which are calculated based on the stock prices such as volatility and Tobin’s Q 
because we are strongly convinced by the argument suggested by Joh (2003), to exclude the 
market-based measures when the stock market appears to be less efficient. We consider that 
stock markets in India are in line with this proposition. For this analysis of Indian data, 
accounting measures of performance are likely to be better measures of performance than 
share market based measures for at least these three reasons. First, researchers have shown 
existence of some market inefficiencies even in the developed countries. This suggests that 
the stock prices in India are not likely to reflect all available information, peculiarly during the period of study. Second, a firm’s accounting profitability s more directly reflected to its 
financial survivability than its market value, and many studies have used accounting 
measures to predict bankruptcy, or financial distress. Thirdly, most of the stocks do not trade 
regularly, which may result in inappropriate pricing of shares. Some stock market scams, also 
happened during the period of study, which makes us believe that stock prices during the 
period of study were prone to price manipulations.  
Though the accounting measures may not take into account the future prospects of 
firm endurance but they do take into account the current scenario of financial strength. The 
share market measures of firm performance such as Tobin’s q may run into severe problems 
in the context of emerging market economy specially India, as most of the firms, go for debt-
financing in these economies rather than using finance from the share market. As a result, 
share market measures may not reflect the actual profits made by the investors on their 
investments. Moreover, stock price information is not readily available for the period of study 
for all the firms. Most of the stocks trade irregularly on the exchange and have very low 
levels of liquidity. We believe that such traded price may not provide actual information 
about the firm value for the thinly traded stocks. Moreover, share prices may not reflect true 
value of firms because it is driven by many factors, which may not be efficient, for example: 
noise trading, portfolio insurance, high transaction costs, and other factors unrelated to firm 
performance may induce randomness in stock prices. Stock market in India also faces high 
volatility during end of financial year due to annual central and state government budget 
announcements. Since market prices determine their values based on accounting information 
provided by the firms in their un-audited quarterly financial results, and audited annual 
financial results. A market measure of performance will also suffer from the drawbacks of the 
accounting performance measures, as well as problems of inefficient capital market. The 
declaration of the annual audited financial results, for the same period (April-March), does not happen at the same time. Stock market may reflect prices adjusted to the information only 
after the declaration, which is different for different firms. Thus, taking the last closing price 
for calculation of the market value of firm may not be desirable, whereas, annual audited 
financial results are for the same period. 
The firm level panel data for our study is primarily obtained from the CMIE, the 
Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy. The data used in the analysis consists of all 
manufacturing firms listed on The Stock Exchange, Bombay (BSE), for which we could get 
their historical shareholding pattern for the period of study. Public Sector firms and firms 
within financial services are not included in the analysis. We confine our analysis to BSE 
listed firms only because all the listed firms are required to follow the norms set by SEBI for 
announcing the financial accounts. The BSE also has the second largest number of domestic 
quoted companies on any stock exchange in the world after NYSE, and more quoted 
companies than either the London or the Tokyo stock exchange. 
We analyze data from 1994 to 2000.
1 We also restrict our analysis to firms that have 
no missing data (on sales, age, shareholding pattern, PBDIT and assets) for at least two 
consecutive years.
2 There are 2575 firms (5224 firm years) in our sample, for which there is 
data required for at least two consecutive years.
3 Our final sample consists of 2517 firms with 
5,117 observations. We perform our analysis after restricting the proxy for capital structure 
(debt intensity) to lie between 1st and 99th percentile to tackle the problem of outliers, which 
may be influential. This leaves us with 5017 observations for 2478 firms. 
The traditional aspect of the agency cost theory suggests that insider ownership aligns 
the interest of management and other stakeholders of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
                                                 
1 We could not use data beyond year 2000, as the definitions of the ownership variables underwent a dramatic 
change following the new disclosure pattern since March 2001 according to SEBI. The details of this change are 
provided in the Appendix. 
2 We cannot avoid these conditioning because we cannot use firms with observations less than two continuous 
years of data in our methodology. 
3 We drop observations, where values reported for capital stock, sales and age are missing, zero, or negative. as managers become self-constrained and avoid rent extraction, since they too have to bear 
the costs of such activities in a proportion of their ownership stake in the firm. Recent studies 
document that the controlling shareholders have significant discretion and power to 
expropriate minority shareholders, as high ownership precludes takeover threats and thus 
decreases firm value (Stulz, 1988). Because, majority owners can redistribute wealth, in both 
efficient and inefficient ways from other minority shareholders, whose interest need not 
coincide. This suggests a non-linear relation between block-holders share ownership and firm 
leverage. In other words, the costs of the concentrated ownership may exceed its benefits. We 
therefore, include four ownership variables: the managerial shareholding (director), 
institutional investors shareholding (institutional), foreign investors shareholding (foreign), 
and corporate shareholding (corporate) with their squares to examine the presence of 
ownership effect. The squares of the ownership variables are included to distinguish the 
change in their effect after a certain threshold, i.e. non-linear impact of ownership structure 
on capital structure. 
Our sample includes more than 2000 firms from India. The significant increase of our 
sample coverage mainly comes from the extensive manual works in overcoming the data 
restrictions on the ownership structure information, which often required supplementary data 
collected from the annual reports of the firms, such as the information on historical 
shareholding pattern, business groups or families and their relatives. We provide the evidence 
by using firm-level panel data that allow us not only to econometrically control for individual 
firm heterogeneity but also to give more data that are informative, more degrees of freedom, 
and more efficiency. 
Data and summary statistics 
For our study of effects of ownership structure (shareholding pattern) on capital structure, in 
emerging economy, we focus our attention on Indian corporate sector. We choose this as an experimental setting as Indian corporate sector offers several distinct advantages over other 
emerging market economies. 
The Indian Corporate Sector has large number of corporate firms, lending itself to 
large sample statistical analysis. It is large by emerging market standards and the contribution 
of the industrial and manufacturing sectors (value added) is close to that in several developed 
economies. Unlike several other emerging markets, firms in India, typically maintain their 
shareholding pattern over the period of study, making it possible to identify the ownership 
affiliation of each sample firm with clarity. It is largely a hybrid of the outsider systems
4 and 
the insider systems
5 of corporate governance. The legal framework for all corporate activities 
including governance and administration of companies, disclosures, shareholders rights, has 
been in place since the enactment of the Companies Act in 1956 and has been fairly stable 
during the period of study. The listing agreements of stock exchanges have also been 
prescribing on-going conditions and continuous obligations for companies.
6 India has had a 
well-established regulatory framework for more than four decades, which forms the 
foundation of the corporate governance system in India. Numerous initiatives have been 
taken by Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) to enhance corporate governance 
practice, in fulfillment of the twin objectives: investor protection and market development, 
for example: streamlining of the disclosure, investor protection guidelines, book building, 
entry norms, listing agreement, preferential allotment disclosures and lot more.  
Although the Indian Corporate Sector is a mix of government and private firms 
(which are again a mix of firms owned by business group families, and multi nationals and 
stand alone firms), it has not suffered from the cronyism that has dominated some of the 
developing economies (read East-Asian economies). Accounting system in India is well 
established and are similar to those followed in most of the development economies. 
                                                 
4 The management of the firm have nil or minimal shareholding. 
5 Management of the firm has significant shareholding. 
6 For more discussion on this, see Kar (2001), pg. 249. Empirical Analysis 
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) have argued that regression of firm performance on 
ownership variables is potentially miss-specified because of the presence of the firm 
heterogeneity. Specifically, if some of the unobserved determinants of firm performance are 
also determinants of ownership, then ownership might spuriously appear to be a determinant 
of firm performance. Zhou (2001) have argued that the firm-fixed effects is not necessary in 
terms of ownership, as the ownership structure in general does not vary over time for a 
specific firm. Similar arguments may be valid while analyzing the impact of corporate 
governance (ownership structure) on firm’s capital structure. However, in Indian case, the 
argument made by Zhou (2001) against the use of firm-level panel data analysis is not valid. 
Kumar (2004) provide detailed discussion on this issue and provided an explicit test to justify 
the inclusion of firm-fixed effects in both forms, namely, in terms of control variables as well 
as in terms of ownership structures. The study provides an explicit F-test for presence of 
fixed effect for control variables, ownership structure, separately as well as jointly. 
Percentage shareholding of different investors may be correlated, because, share ownership 
by Foreign, Institutional, Corporate and Director, along with the shares of ‘other top 50 
shareholders’ and ‘others not included above’ adds up to ‘100’ percent. In order to avoid the 
problem of multicollinearity, this study uses only four main shareholders, i.e. foreign, 
institutional, corporate, and director. 
In this paper, we use firm-level fixed-effects panel data methodology. Primarily 
because, this model allows us to control for both year-variant but firm invariant omitted 
variable as well as firm variant but time-invariant variables.  
This leads us to the estimation of the following equation:  
it1it2ititit Capital Structure =  + *(Ownership)+ *(Control) + +  +  abbdhe  (1) Where (Ownership)it variables measures the fraction of the equity of firm i, lying between 0 
and 100, that is owned by different group of owners in period t. The (Control)it variables are 
firm-specific factors, which may also have influence on the capital structure.  
By using panel data method one is better able to control for the effects of missing or 
unobserved variables. Specifically, under the fixed effects model, the intercepts are allowed 
to be different for different cross-sections and hence the effects of the omitted variables can 
be captured. The effects of the omitted variables are driven by either individual time-invariant 
variables or period individual-invariant variables. The individual time-invariant variables are 
variables that are the same for given cross-sectional units over time but vary across cross-
sectional units (intangible assets, managerial skill). The period individual-invariant variables 
are variables that are same for all cross-sectional units at a given time but vary over the time 
(macro-economic scenario). All these omitted variables may correlate with the independent 
variable. 
Econometric technique employed in the analysis overcome the possible heterogeneity 
and omitted variable problems, which often arise with cross-section analysis. In addition, the 
various measures of the dependent variables and the independent control variables that we 
use for our robustness checks can significantly mitigate the possible measurement errors. The 
hypothesized relationship between firm size and leverage is mixed. On the one hand, the 
larger firms usually have a higher debt ratio because it is usually easier for large firms to 
borrow from the banks or to raise debt in the capital markets. Further, larger firms can 
diversify their operations; therefore, the default risk might decrease which results in high debt 
ratio. On the other hand, information asymmetry is likely less severe for larger firms than for 
smaller firms. The outside investors might find it easier to get more information about the 
firms. This allows larger firm to raise equity directly from the capital markets, allowing large 
firms to have lower leverage.  The debt financing is still the prevalent method in the emerging market economies, 
where the financial system operates mainly under the bank-based economies. In the world of 
asymmetric information, the firm’s tangible fixed assets can be often served as the collateral 
to lower the risk of the lenders who suffer from the agency cost of debt. Firms who have 
greater proportion of fixed assets tend to have higher debt ratio. We incorporate year dummy 
to control for unobserved macroeconomic effects. Detailed discussion of the variable 
construction is provided in the Appendix.1. Unless otherwise stated, we use debt intensity as 
our proxy for the capital structure in the regression analysis. 
Descriptive Statistics 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
We present a detailed structure at the 2-digit level industrial classification of our data in 
Table 1, which clearly reflects the unbalanced nature of the panel. Table 1 also depicts that 
most of the firms included in our sample belongs to NIC-1, NIC-2 or in the NIC-3 according 
to 1-digit industrial classification.  
Table 2 presents summary statistics of financial data of the sample firms. Summary 
statistics relating to the variables used in the analysis is given in Table 2. Inspection of Table 
2 reveals that the mean director ownership level for the whole sample is 17.29 percent. The 
mean percentage shareholders holding of corporate, in the whole sample is 26.12 percent. 
Our sample includes large as well as small firms with respect to sales and assets. Sales (mean 
Rs.179.66 Crore) vary between Rs. 40.91 to Rs. 20,301.39 Crore, with the median level at Rs. 
4075 Crore. The mean ROA is 0.1057 with a maximum of 0.3836 and a minimum of -0.2519.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------- 
The mean level of debt intensity is 0.2409 with a maximum of 4.0632, whereas 
minimum level of debt equity is –1361.67 with median at 0.82. Total borrowing varies from 0 
to Rs. 11520.24 Crore with a standard deviation of 395.95 and kurtosis 284.109. The mean level of PBDIT is 28.9 Crore whereas maximum is 4788.44 Crore and a minimum of –127.94 
Crore, standard deviation of 123.62 and kurtosis of 525.67795. This once again reinforces 
wide variation that exists in our sample. 
Regression Results 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Table 3 reports the results of the cross-sectional regression analysis with 1-digit 
industry dummies, for each year of the sample. To the best of our knowledge, no other study 
has used a panel data framework to analyze the impact of corporate governance on capital 
structure. We find that results vary across years in case of ownership variable’s impact on 
debt intensity. Foreign ownership has non-linear impact on firm performance in 1994, and in 
1996. The institutional investors’ share has positive linear effect and negative effect in 
squares in 1996, and in 1997, 1998 square term becomes insignificant. Group firms are found 
to have significantly higher debt level in 1998, 1999, and in 2000. However, we note that 
Tangibility and LnSale have significantly positive impact for all the years. We also find that 
industry dummies are significant at 1% level for all the years. In sum, our cross-sectional 
results indicate that none of the ownership variables has consistently significant effect over 
the years.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------- 
We report results of pooled OLS with one digit industry dummy in Table 4 (column 
1). In pooled regression without any time dummy, we find that ‘foreign’, ‘institutional’ play 
significant role in the firm’s capital structure choices, and their impact is non-linear, positive 
in levels, and negative in squares. Square of corporate ownership have positive and 
significant impact of debt intensity ratio. Column 2 of Table 4 reports the results with two-
digit industry dummy (NIC-2 digit). The results in terms of impact of ownership variables are 
almost same as in Column 1. We repeat the same exercise with time dummies. We report the results in Column 3 and 4 of Table 4, for NIC-1digit and NIC-2 digit, respectively. Once, 
again results are qualitatively same. We also document the evidence that industry and time 
dummies are significant, separately and jointly. 
From the results of pooled OLS, we find that there is significant impact of ownership 
structure on capital structure of the firm. We now proceed with the fixed-effects panel-data 
model. We report the results of our regression analysis in Table 5, this analysis we use ROA 
as a measure of firm performance. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Column 1 of Table 5 reports the result of the fixed-effect analysis for the full sample. 
Institutional ownership and square of foreign ownership have significant negative impact on 
the debt intensity of the firm. Square of institutional ownership have positive (significant at 
12%) impact of debt intensity. In Column 2 of Table 5, we report the findings of the 
regression after restricting the sample to lie between 1% and 99% of debt intensity to take 
care of the outlier’s effect. Column 3 reports the result after restricting the sample for 10% 
and 90%. Column 4 of the Table 5 reports the results after restricting the sample for only 
those firms for which debt intensity is positive. Our results remain same qualitatively, 
however, institutional ownership looses its significant in some cases. Square of foreign is 
found to have significantly positive impact on debt intensity, consistently. ROA has negative 
and significant impact on firm debt. This finding is in lines with the existing literature 
suggesting that the firms with high performance tend to have lower level of debt in their 
portfolio. Age has non-linear impact on firm debt, positive (insignificant) and negative in 
square (significant), suggesting that the younger firms rely on debt more than the equity, this 
trend reverses once they become older. This result is plausible as the older firms have the 
history of performance and they are known in the market, therefore they may have lower cost 
of capital if raised in form of equity than debt (intangible assets). We also find “Tangibility” to have positive and highly significant impact on debt level of a firm. In Column 5 of Table 5, 
we present the findings of the regression analysis when we interact the group dummy with 
ownership structure of the firms. We find that group firms with higher foreign ownership, 
institutional ownership tend to have lower debt level. However, this negative impact of group 
dummy on debt is found for all the ownership categories though insignificant. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 For a robustness test of our findings, we re-run the above models (Table 5) with 
PBDIT as a measure of performance rather than ROA and present the findings in Table 6. 
Column 1 of Table 6 reports the result of the fixed-effect analysis for the full sample. Column 
2 of Table 6 we report the findings of the regression after restricting the sample to lie 
between 1% and 99% of debt intensity to take care of the outlier’s effect. Column 3 reports 
the result after restricting the sample for 10% and 90%. Column 4 of the Table 6 reports the 
results after restricting the sample for only those firms for which debt intensity is positive. In 
Column 5 of Table 6, we present the findings of the regression analysis when we interact the 
group dummy with ownership structure of the firms. Our findings remain almost similar 
(qualitatively) to the findings from Table 5. This once again reinforces our findings with 
regard to the impact of corporate governance practices on the debt intensity of a firm.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------------- 
To check whether ownership’s collinearity has anything to do with the obtained 
results, we use each ownership group separately. In Table 7, we present our findings when we 
use only ownership variables as explanatory variable in the model of capital structure. One 
may argue that since the ownership variables may be correlated with each other, the previous 
results may be problematic because of collinearity. However, when we use one variable in the 
regression analysis, we may not be able to capture the impact of bilateral relationship between two or more group of owners, and hence may not get the clear picture. We report the 
results for each group of owners separately as well as jointly. Column 1 of Table 7 presents 
the results when we use only foreign ownership as explanatory variables Column 2 for 
directors, Column 3 for Institutional, Column 4 for corporate investors. It is clear from the 
table that in such case only, square of foreign has negative and significant impact on debt 
intensity. Results remain similar even when we use all the ownership variables for the full 
sample (Column 5), for the sample restricted between 1% and 99% based on the debt 
intensity (Column 6), and for sample restricted between 10% and 90% (Column 7). However, 
one may note that in the Column 7, we also find the institutional has negative and significant 
impact on debt intensity. The results suggest that even if we do not take account of other 
variables, which may have influence on the debt holding (capital structure) of a firm, 
ownership structure do play a significant role. 
Conclusions 
This study investigated the financing patterns of Indian firms in last decade. In particular, this 
paper examined financing patterns over time and explored the potential differences across 
firms with corporate governance characteristics. In particular, the main focus of the paper 
was to study differences in financing patterns by shareholding pattern of foreign, corporate, 
director and institutional investors. Using the firm-level panel data of 2251 listed firms from 
India; we find that the firm-level corporate governance has non-linear relationship with the 
firm’s capital structure.  
 The results provide evidence that the distribution of equity ownership among directors 
and external shareholders has a significant relationship with debt equity ratio. This provides 
support for the active monitoring hypothesis, which proposes that external block holders have 
greater incentives and an ability to monitor management. The results also indicate a 
curvilinear relationship between level of insider’s ownership and debt equity relationship. The higher debt ratio of the weaker corporate governance suggests that debt can 
facilitate expropriation in the economies where the institutions appear to be ineffective. Our 
empirical results shed new lights on the importance of these ownership structure and group 
specific factors, but how these factors affect the firm’s debt structure remains for future 
studies. Still, little knowledge is available as to the mechanism of entrenchment that leads to 
the firm’s financing choice. The pyramid or cross-holding structures can be partially used to 
explain the phenomenon, because the direct ownership structure is still common for Indian 
firms. Further, clinical analyses in the form of case studies might need to be carried out to 
further explore this issue.  
The previous research in agency theory does confirm that the corporate governance, 
in particular the role of ownership structure, can affect firm performance by mitigating 
agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. This study extends the agency 
framework and tests the hypotheses, which concern the relationship between ownership 
structure and capital structure. The results have considerable implication regarding the 
corporate governance debate. By arguing for a link between the ownership structure and 
capital structure and through empirical support, this paper adds to an understanding of 
variation in capital structure and role of corporate governance. Moreover, the analysis of 
corporate governance in the financial institutions and its impacts on the firms will be very 
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Debt Intensity  Debt Intensity is the ratio of long-term borrowings (total borrowings + short term bank 
borrowings - commercial paper) to total assets. 
 
Debt Equity 
A measure of a company's financial leverage calculated by dividing long-term debt by 
the shareholders equity. It indicates what proportion of equity and debt the company is 





We measure Return on Assets as the ratio of return to total assets, where return is defined 
as the difference between operating revenues and expenditure before tax and interest 
payments (i.e. PBDIT) and total asset of firm includes fixed assets, investments and 
current assets. R&D expenditures are included in operating expenditure in the year 
incurred, even though the R&D results may produce technical breakthroughs that will 
benefit the firm for years to come. We treat, therefore, R&D as investment rather than as 
current expenditure. Total assets include value of fixed assets, investments, and current 






Foreigners’ Share Holding is share held by foreigners as percentage of total equity 
shares. These include foreign collaborators, foreign financial institutions, foreign 
nationals, and non-resident Indians. 
 
Institutional 
Governments’ and Financial Institutions’ Share Holding is equity shares held by 
government companies as percentage of total equity shares. These includes insurance 
companies, mutual funds, financial institutions, banks, central and state government 
firms, state financial Corporations and other government bodies. 
Corporate  Corporate Share Holding is equity held by corporate bodies as a percentage of total 
equity shares. These include corporate bodies excluding those already covered. 
 
Director 
Directors’ Share Holding is equity held by Directors of the firm as defined in section 6 of 








Age is defined as the number of years since its inception. Where incorporation year 
pertains to the most recent incarnation year of the firm. In the case of firms that were 
reorganized, the year of incorporation may not reflect the true age of a firm (age 
calculated as above may give negative ages also). Therefore, we restrict our analysis to 
those firm-years whose age is non-negative, as calculated. 
 
lnSale 
Defined as natural logarithm of Gross Sales. Gross Sales denotes the revenue generated 
by an enterprise during a given accounting period. It excludes other income and income 
from non-recurring transactions, income of extra-ordinary nature and prior period 
income. Sales are always taken gross of indirect taxes such as excise duties. 
Manufacturing Intensity  Measured as the ratio of manufacturing sales over gross sales. Sales of Manufacturing 
Goods are the sales generated through sale of its ownership manufactured goods. 
R&D Intensity  R&D Intensity is the ratio of total expenditure (capital and current account) incurred by 
the firm in research and development to gross sales. 
Marketing Intensity  Marketing Intensity is the ratio of marketing expenses of the firm to its gross sales. 
Distribution Intensity  Distribution Intensity is the ratio of distribution expenditure to gross sales. 
Tangibility  The tangibility of the firm’s assets (Tangibility) is defined as total assets minus current 
assets divided by total assets. i.e. fixed assets divided by total assets. 
 Appendix 2 
Formula for Construction of Ownership Variables 
Definition of the ownership variable prior and after March, 2001 with reference to Note 7. We do not find one to 
one correspondence from earlier definition to the new definition for some of the ownership variables used in the 
study. 
As per disclosure before March 2001 
Variable  Construction of the ownership variable 
Foreign holdings (Foreign)  Total Equity Holding (Foreign) + Foreign Equity 
(Collaboration) 
Institutional Investors (Institutional)  Financial Institutions, Govt. / Financial institutions 
Development Financial Institutions (Dev. Fin. Inst.)  State Financial Corporations Equity Holding 
Govt. Cos. (Govt.)  Government and Government Companies Equity Holding 
Financial Institutions (Fin. Inst.)  Financial Institutions Equity Holding - State Financial 
Corporations Equity Holding 
Corporate bodies (Corporate)  Equity Holding (Corporations) + Other Corporate Bodies 
Equity Holding 
Directors (Director)  Directors and their Relatives Equity Holding + Indian 
Promoters Equity Holding + Foreign Promoters Equity 
Holding 
Other top 50 share holders (not covered above)  Equity Holding of other Top50 Shareholders 
Others including Indian Public  Others Equity Holding 
Total Equity Holding  Total Equity 
As per new disclosure pattern since March 2001 
New Variables nearest possible mapping with Old Ownership Variables 
Promoters Equity Holding  Indian Promoters Equity + Government and Government 
Companies Equity + Other Government Equity + Foreign 
Equity (Collaborator) + Foreign Equity (Promoters) 
Indian Promoters Equity Holding  Indian Promoters Equity + Government and Government 
Companies Equity + Other Government Equity 
Private Equity Holding  Indian Promoters Equity 
Government Equity Holding  Government and Government Companies Equity + Other 
Government Equity 
Foreign Promoters/Collaborator’s Equity Holding  Foreign Promoters Equity Holding + Foreign Collaborator’s 
Equity Holding 
Institutional Investors Equity Holding  Foreign Institutions Equity Holding (FIIs) + Financial 
Institutions Equity Holding 
Private Corporate Bodies Equity Holding  Indian Public’s Equity Holding + Foreign Individuals Equity 
Holding + Corporations Equity Holding + Directors and their 
Relatives Equity Holding + Equity Holding of other Top50 
Shareholders) 
Others including Indian Public  Others Equity Holding 
Total Equity Holding  Total Equity Table 1 Data structure for NIC-2 digit Industry code 
Based on the industrial classification of National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), India’s National 
Industrial Classification 1998. 
NIC-2 Digit  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  Total 
11- Petroleum And Natural Gas    2  20  15   15    6   16    74 
12- Mining Of Uranium And Thorium Ores      3  4    6    1    3    17 
13- Mining Of Metal Ores            3    1    1     5 
14- Other Mining And Quarrying   1   9  11   11   14    5   15    66 
15- Manufacture Of Food Products And 
Beverages 
15  35  72   70  106   58  118   474 
16- Manufacture Of Tobacco Products   1   2   3    3    7    1    7    24 
17- Manufacture Of Textiles  19  49  80   77  121   61  120   527 
18- Manufacture Of Wearing Apparel; 
Dressing And Dyeing Of Fur 
 1   7  10   10   15   10   10    63 
19- Tanning And Dressing Of Leather   5   5   5    9   10    4   16    54 
20- Manufacture Of Wood And Of Products 
Of Wood And Cork 
 1   2   3    6    7    1   10    30 
21- Manufacture Of Paper And Paper 
Products 
 5  10  18   22   37   18   26   136 
22- Publishing, Printing And Reproduction 
Of Recorded Media 
 2   1   6    5    6    3    8    31 
23- Manufacture Of Coke, Refined 
Petroleum Products And Nuclear Fuel 
 1   1   6    9    9    5    8    39 
24- Manufacture Of Chemicals And 
Chemical Products 
38  70  149  165  245  150  237  1054 
25- Manufacture Of Rubber And Plastics 
Products 
14  22  63   53   75   41   79   347 
26- Manufacture Of Other Non-Metallic 
Mineral Products 
11  22  35   42   58   17   56   241 
27- Manufacture Of Basic Metals  19  31  54   77   93   46  101   421 
28- Manufacture Of Fabricated Metal 
Products, Except Machinery And Equipment 
 2   8  22   18   25   17   21   113 
29- Manufacture Of Machinery And 
Equipment 
22  38  57   69   86   45   79   396 
30- Manufacture Of Office, Accounting And 
Computing Machinery 
 2   2   4    5   10    5   20    48 
31- Manufacture Of Electrical Machinery 
And Apparatus 
10  17  43   39   51   27   45   232 
32- Manufacture Of Radio, Television And 
Communication Equipment And Apparatus 
 7  10  17   30   31   14   30   139 
33- Manufacture Of Medical, Precision And 
Optical Instruments, Watches And Clocks 
 1   2  10    9   14    9   12    57 
34- Manufacture Of Motor Vehicles, Trailers 
And Semi-Trailers 
 8  16  28   33   56   21   48   210 
35- Manufacture Of Other Transport 
Equipment 
 1   2   4    9   10    6   11    43 
36- Manufacture Of Furniture     2   8    9   11    8   15    53 
40- Electricity, Gas, Steam And Hot Water 
Supply 
4   4  4    4   10    2    6    34 
45- Construction            1      1     1 
51- Wholesale And Retail Trade      1  1       16     3 
65- Transport, Storage And Communications     2             2 
70- Real Estate Activities              1     1 
72- Computer And Related Activities    9  19  16  35  30  54   163 
92- Sewage And Refuse Disposal, Sanitation 
Products 
          1       1 
97- Recreational, Cultural And Sporting 
Goods 
      1    1       2 
98-Diversified  7  10  10  22  34  10  21   123 
Total  197  388  776  843  1201  624  1195  5224 Table 2 
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 Table 3 
Results of Cross-sectional regressions 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
ROA  -0.160  -0.145  -0.121  -0.065  -0.333  -0.428  -0.192 
  (0.278)  (0.148)  (0.114)  (0.286)  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Age  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001 
  (0.677)  (0.214)  (0.191)  (0.110)  (0.002)** (0.002)**  (0.073)+ 
Square of Age  4.13e-06  3.71e-06  2.48e-06  6.48e-06  6.51e-06  1.3e-05  3.37e-06 
  (0.729)  (0.696)  (0.703)  (0.506)  (0.237)  (0.086)+  (0.420) 
LnSale  0.046  0.026  0.016  0.024  0.029  0.042  0.013 
  (0.152)  (0.018)*  (0.031)*  (0.011)*  (0.002)** (0.000)**  (0.072)+ 
Square of LnSale  -0.003  -0.002  -3.39e-04  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001 
  (0.400)  (0.308)  (0.730)  (0.226)  (0.333)  (0.100)+  (0.235) 
Tangibility  0.396  0.369  0.408  0.496  0.470  0.485  0.440 
  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Marketing Intensity  -0.653  0.309  -0.079  0.327  -0.001  0.258  -0.311 
  (0.149)  (0.285)  (0.563)  (0.115)  (0.994)  (0.282)  (0.061)+ 
Advertising Intensity  -0.516  0.262  -0.009  -0.285  0.232  -0.029  0.388 
  (0.491)  (0.326)  (0.960)  (0.083)+  (0.289)  (0.916)  (0.217) 
Distribution Intensity  -0.003  0.342  0.094  -0.003  0.043  0.044  0.129 
  (0.995)  (0.042)*  (0.467)  (0.979)  (0.788)  (0.804)  (0.407) 
R&D Intensity  2.021  1.581  -1.557  0.369  0.015  -0.006  -0.410 
  (0.488)  (0.684)  (0.327)  (0.421)  (0.913)  (0.000)**  (0.625) 
Foreign  0.005  0.001  0.002  2.1e-04  0.001  -2.58e-04  4.28e-04 
  (0.035)*  (0.683)  (0.093)+  (0.812)  (0.371)  (0.791)  (0.570) 
Director  2.57e-04  3.68e-04  0.001  -0.002  -3.91e-04  -4.25e-04  -3.93e-05 
  (0.922)  (0.770)  (0.405)  (0.044)*  (0.579)  (0.663)  (0.957) 
Institutional  0.006  0.002  0.006  0.004  0.003  0.002  0.003 
  (0.265)  (0.525)  (0.001)**  (0.060)+  (0.038)*  (0.485)  (0.127) 
Corporate  -0.001  -0.001  3.98e-04  1.23e-04  2.42e-04  -0.002  -0.001 
  (0.496)  (0.479)  (0.621)  (0.874)  (0.719)  (0.024)*  (0.209) 
Square of Foreign  -9.45e-05  -2.59e-05  -3.34e-05  -2.19e-05  -1.6e-05  -1.7e-05  -1.99e-05 
  (0.017)*  (0.288)  (0.040)*  (0.124)  (0.232)  (0.261)  (0.068)+ 
Square of Director  -1.98e-05  -2.1e-05  -1.57e-05  1.76e-05  7.64e-06  -7.21e-06  -2.93e-06 
  (0.647)  (0.281)  (0.207)  (0.164)  (0.460)  (0.594)  (0.788) 
Square of Institutional  -1.21e-04  -3.29e-05  -8.64e-05  -4.24e-05  -3.19e-05  -6.79e-06  -8.8e-05 
  (0.519)  (0.506)  (0.029)*  (0.288)  (0.498)  (0.901)  (0.214) 
Square of Corporate  2.43e-05  1.09e-05  2.04e-06  7.43e-07  4.05e-06  3.21e-05  1.2e-05 
  (0.403)  (0.506)  (0.859)  (0.944)  (0.653)  (0.006)**  (0.093)+ 
Group Dummy  0.033  0.019  0.019  0.017  0.022  0.033  0.050 
  (0.195)  (0.232)  (0.117)  (0.139)  (0.030)*  (0.025)*  (0.000)** 
Constant  -0.112  -0.072  0.042  0.341  -0.018  -0.132  0.126 
  (0.213)  (0.234)  (0.415)  (0.000)**  (0.815)  (0.003)** (0.000)** 
Observations  183  356  721  786  1126  587  1059 
R-squared  0.481  0.417  0.407  0.447  0.453  0.527  0.403 
Industry Effect  0.000**  0.000**  0.080+  0.000**  0.000**  0.000**  0.000** 
 
+, *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. p-values are reported in 
parentheses.Table 4 
Results of Pooled Regressions Analysis with Industry and Time Dummy 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  NIC-1  NIC-2  NIC-1-T  NIC-2-T 
ROA  -0.196  -0.197  -0.190  -0.191 
  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
Age  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
Square of Age  3.33e-06  3.74e-06  3.71e-06  4.16e-06 
  (0.188)  (0.133)  (0.142)  (0.095)+ 
LnSale  0.021  0.020  0.021  0.020 
  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
Square of LnSale  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.024)*  (0.044)*  (0.019)*  (0.036)* 
Tangibility  0.456  0.454  0.455  0.453 
  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
Marketing Intensity  -0.024  -0.009  -0.030  -0.015 
  (0.759)  (0.910)  (0.694)  (0.848) 
Advertising Intensity  -0.085  -0.032  -0.073  -0.018 
  (0.266)  (0.698)  (0.340)  (0.822) 
Distribution Intensity  0.112  0.100  0.110  0.097 
  (0.027)*  (0.078)+  (0.029)*  (0.086)+ 
R&D Intensity  -0.006  -0.006  -0.007  -0.007 
  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
Foreign  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (0.067)+  (0.090)+  (0.049)*  (0.066)+ 
Director  -0.001  -4.77e-04  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.132)  (0.161)  (0.118)  (0.140) 
Institutional  0.004  0.003  0.004  0.003 
  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
Corporate  -3.63e-04  -4.5e-04  -3.48e-04  -4.38e-04 
  (0.233)  (0.141)  (0.252)  (0.150) 
Square of Foreign  -2.16e-05  -2.17e-05  -2.27e-05  -2.28e-05 
  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
Square of Director  2.64e-06  2.28e-06  2.62e-06  2.27e-06 
  (0.611)  (0.654)  (0.614)  (0.655) 
Square of Institutional  -4.52e-05  -4.67e-05  -4.58e-05  -4.74e-05 
  (0.013)*  (0.013)*  (0.011)*  (0.011)* 
Square of Corporate  9.32e-06  1.07e-05  8.66e-06  1.01e-05 
  (0.017)*  (0.006)**  (0.026)*  (0.010)* 
Group Dummy  0.033  0.030  0.033  0.031 
  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
Constant  -0.160  0.130  -0.162  0.126 
  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
Observations  4818  4818  4818  4818 
R-squared  0.396  0.410  0.397  0.411 
Industry Effect  0.000**  0.000**  0.000**  0.000** 
Time Effect      0.072+  0.071+ 
Joint Effect      0.000**  0.000** 
 
+, *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. p-values are reported in 
parentheses.Table 5 
Results of Panel Data Regressions with ROA 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  None  1-99  10-90  Debt Int.>0  1-99-Group 
ROA  -0.206  -0.185  -0.158  -0.185  -0.179 
  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.001)**  (0.000)** 
Age  0.004  0.002  -0.002  0.008  0.002 
  (0.191)  (0.406)  (0.479)  (0.002)**  (0.504) 
Square of Age  -8e-05  -7.47e-05  -3.27e-05  -7.47e-05  -7.28e-05 
  (0.006)**  (0.007)**  (0.233)  (0.001)**  (0.009)** 
LnSale  0.007  0.006  0.007  0.001  0.006 
  (0.430)  (0.457)  (0.188)  (0.874)  (0.476) 
Square of LnSale  -4.16e-04  4.69e-04  0.001  -0.001  3.48e-04 
  (0.773)  (0.747)  (0.407)  (0.652)  (0.809) 
Tangibility  0.365  0.339  0.324  0.336  0.341 
  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
Marketing Intensity  -0.251  -0.387  -0.176  -0.292  -0.377 
  (0.140)  (0.030)*  (0.209)  (0.131)  (0.036)* 
Advertising Intensity  -0.126  -0.337  -0.227  -0.294  -0.322 
  (0.481)  (0.035)*  (0.176)  (0.088)+  (0.042)* 
Distribution Intensity  -0.018  0.262  0.146  0.196  0.244 
  (0.936)  (0.064)+  (0.336)  (0.222)  (0.088)+ 
R&D Intensity  -0.010  -0.033  0.547  -0.026  -0.039 
  (0.936)  (0.772)  (0.386)  (0.817)  (0.707) 
Foreign  0.001  0.001  4.89e-04  0.001   
  (0.504)  (0.528)  (0.540)  (0.244)   
Director  -0.001  4.09e-04  -3.31e-04  -0.001   
  (0.492)  (0.681)  (0.665)  (0.439)   
Institutional  -0.005  -0.004  -0.005  -0.006   
  (0.064)+  (0.139)  (0.027)*  (0.028)*   
Corporate  -2.01e-04  -0.001  -0.001  -5.79e-04   
  (0.828)  (0.418)  (0.321)  (0.677)   
Square of Foreign  -3.46e-05  -3.69e-05  -2.43e-05  -3.64e-05   
  (0.094)+  (0.024)*  (0.100)+  (0.026)*   
Square of Director  1e-05  -2.03e-05  --5.32e-06  -2.03e-05   
  (0.639)  (0.177)  (0.668)  (0.633)   
Square of Institutional  1.28e-04  6.39e-05  1.44e-04  6.37e-05   
  (0.115)  (0.343)  (0.067)+  (0.065)+   
Square of Corporate  -1.35e-06  2.80e-06  5.15e-06  2.80e-06   
  (0.916)  (0.771)  (0.584)  (0.986)   
Foreign*Group          -0.001 
          (0.107) 
Institutional*Group          -0.002 
          (0.052)+ 
Corporate*Group          -4.37e-04 
          (0.252) 
Director*Group          -3.51e-04 
          (0.671) 
Constant  0.105  0.136  0.162  0.060  0.130 
  (0.073)+  (0.017)*  (0.001)**  (0.266)  (0.019)* 
Observations  5117  4818  4127  4867  4818 
Adj R-squared  0.819  0.825  0.791  0.823  0.825 
Time Effect  0.050+  0.040*  0.090+  0.000**  0.060+ 
 
+, *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. p-values are reported in 
parentheses.Table 6 
Results of Panel Data Regressions with PBDIT 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  None  1-99  10-90  Debt Int.>0  1-99-Group 
PBDIT  4.61e-05  3.89e-05  3.55e-05  3.89e-05  3.96e-05 
  (0.067)+  (0.102)  (0.127)  (0.049)*  (0.098)+ 
Age  0.008  0.006  0.001  0.012  0.006 
  (0.015)*  (0.046)*  (0.670)  (0.000)**  (0.064)+ 
Square of Age  -8.42e-05  -7.88e-05  -3.84e-05  -7.88e-05  -7.68e-05 
  (0.005)**  (0.006)**  (0.176)  (0.001)**  (0.008)** 
LnSale  -1.42e-04  -2.53e-04  0.005  -0.005  -2.94e-04 
  (0.984)  (0.972)  (0.310)  (0.551)  (0.968) 
Square of LnSale  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001 
  (0.122)  (0.439)  (0.427)  (0.108)  (0.389) 
Tangibility  0.389  0.356  0.346  0.357  0.357 
  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
Marketing Intensity  -0.200  -0.330  -0.160  -0.235  -0.321 
  (0.231)  (0.059)+  (0.250)  (0.217)  (0.071)+ 
Advertising Intensity  -0.092  -0.306  -0.194  -0.262  -0.294 
  (0.601)  (0.045)*  (0.236)  (0.110)  (0.054)+ 
Distribution Intensity  -0.011  0.264  0.162  0.198  0.249 
  (0.960)  (0.055)+  (0.272)  (0.203)  (0.075)+ 
R&D Intensity  -0.013  -0.035  0.566  -0.024  -0.042 
  (0.916)  (0.764)  (0.375)  (0.835)  (0.689) 
Foreign  0.001  3.97e-04  4.62e-04  0.001   
  (0.605)  (0.652)  (0.571)  (0.299)   
Director  -0.001  0.001  -3.19e-04  -0.001   
  (0.597)  (0.624)  (0.684)  (0.499)   
Institutional  -0.004  -0.002  -0.004  -0.005   
  (0.193)  (0.354)  (0.061)+  (0.092)+   
Corporate  -1.67e-04  -0.001  -0.001  -5.86e-04   
  (0.860)  (0.431)  (0.377)  (0.651)   
Square of Foreign  -3.11e-05  -3.26e-05  -2.07e-05  -3.26e-05   
  (0.149)  (0.057)+  (0.186)  (0.046)*   
Square of Director  6.94e-06  -2.23e-05  -5.25e-06  -3.23e-05   
  (0.748)  (0.154)  (0.679)  (0.709)   
Square of Institutional  7.74e-05  1.5e-05  1.12e-04  1.5e-05   
  (0.391)  (0.834)  (0.119)  (0.243)   
Square of Corporate  -1.40e-06  3.43e-06  4.52e-06  3.43e-06   
  (0.913)  (0.724)  (0.631)  (0.965)   
Foreign*Group          -0.001 
          (0.193) 
Institutional*Group          -0.002 
          (0.033)* 
Corporate*Group          -4.07e-04 
          (0.303) 
Director*Group          -4.17e-04 
          (0.630) 
Constant  0.039  0.078  0.100  0.002  0.071 
  (0.481)  (0.131)  (0.036)*  (0.965)  (0.150) 
Observations  5117  4818  4127  4867  4818 
Adj R-squared  0.814  0.820  0.787  0.818  0.820 
Time Effect  0.050+  0.030*  0.060+  0.000**  0.050+ 
 
+, *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. p-values are reported in 
parentheses.Table 7: Results of Panel Data Regressions with only ownership variables 
Column 1 of the table reports the results only with “Foreign” ownership as an explanatory variable. Column 2 of 
the table reports the results only with “Director” ownership as an explanatory variable. Column 3 of the table 
reports the results only with “Institutional” ownership as an explanatory variable. Column 4 of the table reports 
the results only with “Corporate” ownership as an explanatory variable. Column 5 of the table reports the results 
only with four ownership categories as explanatory variables. Column 6 of the table reports the results only with 
four ownership categories as explanatory variables, and sample is restricted to lie between 1 and 99 percentile 
based on the dependent variable. Column 7 of the table reports the results only with four ownership categories 
as explanatory variables, and sample is restricted to lie between 10 and 90 percentile based on the dependent 
variable. Dependent variable in all the regressions is Debt Intensity. +, *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. p-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  Foreign  Director  Institutional Corporate  All  1-99  10-90 
Foreign  0.001        0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (0.259)        (0.339)  (0.452)  (0.362) 
Square of Foreign  -4.02e-05        -4.13e-05 -3.92e-05 -2.69e-05 
  (0.023)*        (0.066)+  (0.026)*  (0.093)+ 
Director    4.66e-04      -0.001  2.02e-04  -0.001 
    (0.653)      (0.470)  (0.843)  (0.465) 
Square of Director    -1.74e-05      1.01e-04  -1.8e-05  -9.29e-07 
    (0.279)      (0.649)  (0.265)  (0.946) 
Institutional      -0.002    -0.003  -0.002  -0.004 
      (0.524)    (0.232)  (0.463)  (0.095)+ 
Square of Institutional      -9.65e-06    5.95e-05  -5.09e-06  9.55e-05 
      (0.898)    (0.506)  (0.947)  (0.244) 
Corporate        -3.31e-04  -1.28e-04  -0.001  -0.001 
        (0.671)  (0.896)  (0.399)  (0.489) 
Square of Corporate        5.86e-06  -2.59e-06 3.90e-06  3.76e-06 
        (0.562)  (0.846)  (0.709)  (0.724) 
Constant  0.240  0.241  0.239  0.240  0.273  0.265  0.251 
  (0.000)** (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Observations  4906  4906  4906  4906  5224  4906  4178 
Adj R-squared  0.795  0.794  0.794  0.793  0.790  0.796  0.748 
Time Effect  0.000**  0.000**  0.000**  0.000**  0.000**  0.000**  0.000** 
 